The institutional balance, an Ill-fated principle of EU law? by Chamon, Merijn
 
 
 
The institutional balance, an Ill-fated principle of EU
law?
Citation for published version (APA):
Chamon, M. (2015). The institutional balance, an Ill-fated principle of EU law? European Public Law,
21(2), 371-392.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2015
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 07 Jan. 2021
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
Published by:
Kluwer Law International
PO Box 316
2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn
The Netherlands
Website: www.kluwerlaw.com
Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by:
Aspen Publishers, Inc.
7201 McKinney Circle
Frederick, MD 21704
United States of America
Email: customer.service@aspenpublishers.com
Sold and distributed in all other countries by:
Turpin Distribution Services Ltd.
Stratton Business Park
Pegasus Drive, Biggleswade
Bedfordshire SG18 8TQ
United Kingdom
Email: kluwerlaw@turpin-distribution.com
European Public Law is published quarterly (March, June, September and December).
This journal is also available on line at www.kluwerlawonline.com. Sample copies and other information
are available at www.kluwerlaw.com. For further information please contact our sales department at
+31 172 641562 or at sales@kluwerlaw.com. For Marketing Opportunities please contact marketing@
kluwerlaw.com
Online subscription prices (2015): EUR 520/USD 693/GBP 382.
Print subscription prices, including postage (2015):EUR 561/USD 750/GBP 414.
European Public Law is indexed/abstracted in the European Legal Journals Index.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISSN 1354-3725
© 2015 Kluwer Law International BV,The Netherlands
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without written permission from the publisher.
Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to:
Permissions Department,Wolters Kluwer Legal, 76 Ninth Avenue, 7th Floor, NewYork, NY 10011-
5201, USA. Email: permissions@kluwerlaw.com
Printed and Bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY.
 Editor-in-Chief 
  Professor P J Birkinshaw
  Institute of European Public Law
  The University of Hull
  Hull HU6 7RX
  Tel: + (44) 01482 465742
  Fax: + (44) 01482 466388
  E-mail: P.J.Birkinshaw@hull.ac.uk
Editorial Committee Dr Alison L Young, Fellow and Tutor in Law, Hertford College and Associate Professor
in Law, University of Oxford
Professor Cosmo Graham, Law School, University of Leicester
Professor Stephen Tierney, Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh
 Professor Mads Andenas, Law School,  University of Oslo 
Professor Christopher McCrudden, FBA. Professor of Law, Queen’s University Belfast
 International Editorial Professor Jean-Bernard Auby, Professor of Public Law, Sciences Po Paris,  
Advisory Board Director of the ‘Governance and Public Law’ Center
  Professor John Bell, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge
idnoiBaerdnArosseforP , Co-Director, Centre for European Law, 
Kings College London
Professor Iain Cameron, University of Uppsala, Sweden
itihCoiraMrosseforP , Ordinario di Diritto Administrativo, University of Florence
Professor Walter van Gerven, Professor of Law, University of Leuven, 
formerly  Avocat Général, Court of Justice of the European Communities
 Professor Ian Harden, Professor of Public Law and Legal Adviser to the European 
Ombudsman, Strasbourg
 Professor Jeffrey Jowell QC, Faculty of Laws, University College London
 His Honour Mr Justice Gerard Hogan, Judge of the High Court of Ireland
 Bernard Stirn, Président de la Section du Contentieux, Conseil d'État, Paris
 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC, President of Interights, Visiting Professor, 
University College London
 Sven Norberg , former Judge of the EFTA Court and Director at DGIV in  the European
   Commission
Professor David O’Keeffe, Emeritus Professor of European Law, 
  University College London
 Professor Dr Michael Potacs, Institute of Austrian and European Public Law, 
Vienna  University of Economics and Business, Wien, Austria
 Professor Tony Prosser, Professor of Public Law, Department of Law, 
University of Bristol
Professor Dr Jürgen Schwarze, Director, Institut für Öffentliches Recht,  
Albert-Ludvigs-Universität, Freiburg
yeldeSnehpetSriS , formerly Lord Justice of Appeal, Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales, Royal Courts of Justice, London
Professor Cass Sunstein, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School
Professor John Temple Lang, formerly Director, DGIV Competition, 
European Commission
Professor Dr Christiaan Timmermans, Erasmus University Rotterdam, former
  Judge at the European Court of Justice
Yitzhak Zamir, Professor of Public Law, Dean of the Hebrew University
  of Jerusalem’s Faculty of Law, a former Attorney General of Israel and Judge
  in the Israeli Supreme Court
Author Guide
[A] Aim of the Journal
European Public Law is a forum for the discussion of issues in the development of public law. The journal traces the public law of the Member
States as it is shaped by the law of the European Union as well as by the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights. 
The subject area is given a broad interpretation and includes EC Law and Public Law, the Public Law of European States and other jurisdictions
where relevant, including those jurisdictions which have been influenced by European legal systems, and Comparative Public Law. No particular
approach or methodology is favoured, but in order to ensure work of a high academic standard all articles will be refereed by assessors with
established reputations in the subject area.
[B] Contact Details
Manuscripts should be submitted to the Editor-in-Chief, Professor Patrick Birkinshaw. 
E-mail: P.J.Birkinshaw@hull.ac.uk
Book reviews should be sent to Book Review Editor, Dr Mike Varney. 
E-mail: M.R.Varney@hull.ac.uk
[C] Submission Guidelines
[1] Manuscripts should be submitted electronically, in Word format, via e-mail. 
[2] Submitted manuscripts are understood to be final versions. They must not have been published or submitted for publication elsewhere.
[3] Articles should not exceed 12,000 words (including footnotes). 10,000 words is the preferred length. Only exceptionally will an article be
      accepted that is over 12,000 words. Shorter articles of between 2,000 to 6,000 words in length are also invited for the ‘Scrutiny’ section. These
     articles will also be refereed.
[4] Only articles in English will be considered for publication. Manuscripts should be written in standard English, while using ‘ize’ and ‘ization’
      instead of ‘ise’ and ‘isation’. Preferred reference source is the Oxford English Dictionary. However, in case of quotations the original spelling
      should be maintained.
[5] The article should contain an abstract, a short summary of about 200 words. This abstract will also be added to the free search zone of the
      Kluwer Online database. An abstract is not required for a shorter ‘Scrutiny’ article. An author whose first language is not English may write an
      abstract in their first language in addition to an English abstract.
[6] A brief biographical note, including both the current affiliation as well as the e-mail address of the author(s), should be provided in the first
      footnote of the manuscript.
[7] An article title should be concise, with a maximum of 70 characters.
[8] Special attention should be paid to quotations, footnotes, and references. All citations and quotations must be verified before submission of
      the manuscript. The accuracy of the contribution is the responsibility of the author. The journal has adopted the Association of Legal Writing
      Directors (ALWD) legal citation style to ensure uniformity. Citations should not appear in the text but in the footnotes. Footnotes should be
      numbered consecutively, using the footnote function in Word so that if any footnotes are added or deleted the others are automatically
      renumbered. 
[9] A bibliography should not be included in the article. 
[10] Tables should be self-explanatory and their content should not be repeated in the text. Do not tabulate unnecessarily. Tables should be
        numbered and should include concise titles. 
[11] Heading levels should be clearly indicated.
For further information on style, see the House Style Guide on the website:
www.kluwerlaw.com/ContactUs/
[D] Review Process
[1] All articles are refereed. Before submission to the publisher, manuscripts will be reviewed by the Board of Editors and sent out for external
      peer review. Articles may be returned to the author for revision, or accepted or rejected. 
[2] The journal’s policy is to provide an initial assessment of the submission within forty working days of receiving the posted submission. 
[3] The editors reserve the right to make alterations as to style, punctuation, grammar etc.
[4] The author will also receive PDF proofs of the article, and any corrections should be returned within the scheduled dates.
[E] Copyright
[1] Publication in the journal is subject to authors signing a ‘Consent to Publish and Transfer of  Copyright’ form. 
[2] The following rights remain reserved to the author: the right to make copies and distribute copies (including via e-mail) of the contribution
       for own personal use, including for own classroom teaching use and to research colleagues, for personal use by such colleagues, and the right
       to present the contribution at meetings or conferences and to distribute copies of the contribution to the delegates attending the meeting; the
       right to post the contribution on the author’s personal or institutional web site or server, provided acknowledgement is given to the original
       source of publication; for the author’s  employer, if the contribution is a ‘work for hire’, made within the scope of the author’s employment,
       the right to use all or part of the contribution for other intra-company use (e.g. training), including by posting the contribution on secure,
       internal corporate intranets; and the right to use the contribution for his/her further career by including the contribution in other
       publications such as a dissertation and/or a collection of articles provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication.
[3] The author shall receive for the rights granted a free copy of the issue of the journal in which the article is published, plus a PDF file of his/her
      article.
The Institutional Balance, an Ill-Fated
Principle of EU Law?
Merijn CHAMON*
The institutional balance is a concept often used in EU legal doctrine as well as being regularly
invoked by parties before the Court. In theory, it is a genuine self-standing principle of EU law
as recognized by the Court of Justice, in practice however it is simply used as an easy shorthand
for the (Treaty-defined) rules governing the relations between the institutions.An analysis of the
Court’s jurisprudence indeed shows that despite having qualified the institutional balance as a
legal principle, the Court is unreceptive towards arguments based thereupon. In combination with
recent developments, inter alia related to the political responses to the euro crisis, flouting the
EU’s institutional balance, it may be questioned whether the institutional balance really is an
actionable principle of EU law.The Court should clarify the situation by actually enforcing the
institutional balance or by reconsidering its qualification of that balance as a legal principle.
1 INTRODUCTION
The institutional balance is a well-known but elusive concept in EU legal
literature: it is not mentioned let alone defined in the Treaties but it was
introduced by the Court in its case law. A number of legal authors are highly
critical of the added value of the notion and questions its status as a principle of
EU law.The function of the institutional balance is furthermore obscured by the
parallels often drawn between the notion itself and the principle of separation of
powers. This contribution aims to add to the debate by clarifying the possible
scope and function of the institutional balance. In this, the Court’s jurisprudence
will also be taken into account since if the notion of institutional balance indeed
amounts to a principle of EU law, as the Court has asserted, it should also use it as
such.
Therefore, in a first section some brief remarks on the relation between the
institutional balance and the separation of powers will be formulated. In the
following section the critical reception of the institutional balance in legal
literature is discussed and the possible content and function of a principle of
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institutional balance will be explored.The existing jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice on the institutional balance is then turned to in order to determine
whether the institutional balance indeed functions as an actionable principle, i.e.,
whether it is useful and invokable before a judge. The analysis of the Court’s
jurisprudence casts doubt on this and together with the current developments in
European law resulting from the euro and financial crises, the institutional balance
is found to be at an important crossroads.
2 INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AS SEPARATION OF POWERS?
The interconnectedness of the ‘principle of institutional balance’ with that of the
separation of powers is often noted.1 However, how both precisely relate to each
other is not clear. Jacqué notes that the principle of institutional balance is no less
to the Court than a substitute for the principle of separation of powers.2
According to Barnett, the arrangements between the institutions in the EU are not
governed by the separation of powers, but by the institutional balance.3 Prechal
suggests that the principle of institutional balance prevents the concentration of
powers at European level and may therefore ‘be considered to be an equivalent to
the doctrine of separation of powers, or rather “checks and balances” as they exist
in national systems’.4 According to de Búrca, the institutional balance takes the
place of the notion of separation of powers in the EU.5 Guillermin, however,
claims both principles, notwithstanding their analogies, cannot simply be
assimilated.6 Apart from this dissenting view, there seems to be a general
consensus, perhaps based on the multi-interpretable phrasing, that both principles
are strongly related.
Because the principle of separation of powers mainly applies to national
polities Achterberg questioned whether it was at all sensible to try to apply it to
the EU.7 Ipsen claims the principle is not even adequate anymore to structure the
1 The fact that this relationship has not been studied in depth was remarked by Majone who found it
surprising ‘that students of European integration have devoted so little analytic effort to comparing the two
principles in order to get a better grasp of the elusive constitutional nature of the EC’. See G. Majone,
‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’, (2002) 8 ELJ 3, p. 323.
2 J. P. Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’, (2004) 41 CMLRev. 2, p. 348. See also G. Conway,
‘Recovering a Separation of Powers in the European Union’, (2011) 17 ELJ 3, p. 319.
3 H. Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law, NewYork, Routledge, 2011, p. 210.
4 S. Prechal, ‘Institutional Balance:A Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’, in Heukels, Blokker &
Brus (eds), The European Union after Amsterdam,The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 280.
5 G. de Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional Analysis’, in Craig & de
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 58.
6 G. Guillermin, ‘Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice
des Communautés européennes’, (1992) 119 Journal du droit international 2, pp. 319–20.
7 N. Achterberg, ‘Rezension: Die Gewaltenteilung in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, (1968) 3
Europarecht 2, pp. 240–245.
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exercise of public power in modern states and should for this reason alone be
rejected as a guiding principle for the EU. Furthermore he notes the radically new
method and form of economic integration in the EU, relieving the national state
of certain of its tasks,8 which would be another argument in favour of rejecting a
separation of powers in the EU.
However, looking at the ratio of the principle, these objections do not seem
forceful. The principle of separation of powers aims to prevent arbitrary rule,9
hence arguing that it is only relevant to national states would be tantamount to
saying arbitrary rule is only a risk in the national state. Furthermore, as a basic rule,
the principle simply refers to the exercise of public authority, which means that
the principle may be applied whenever public authority is exercised. Ipsen’s
observations on the novelty of European integration are not disputed here, but his
deductions are. No matter how revolutionary the EU polity may be, it remains a
hierarchic polity with partially centralized powers, creating a risk of power abuse
and arbitrary rule. This is something Dehousse also seems to overlook when he
observes that the principle is enshrined in liberal constitutions to protect political
freedom and that this concern was completely absent when the Treaties were
drafted.10 Instead, the checks and balances in the Treaties are inspired by a concern
to prevent excessive power slippage to independent institutions such as the
Commission. It seems Dehousse then takes on a rather idealized view of the past
when he juxtaposes the ‘sheer power logic’ which supposedly guided the Treaty
drafters with the liberal political philosophy which allegedly guided the drafters of
national constitutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century.
More recently, Lenaerts and Desomer have claimed that the Court of Justice
has rejected the principle as unknown in the EU legal system in the joined Cases
188 to 190/80.11 According to Nicolaysen as well this ruling by the Court
affirmed the original character of the EC to which the classic separation of powers
does not apply.12 In this case however, the Court merely rejected the UK’s claim
that all original law-making power is vested in the Council, clarifying both the
Commission and Council can lay down measures of general application,
depending on the specific Treaty provisions in question.13 What this case does
8 H.P. Ipsen, Europäisches gemeinschaftsrecht,Tübingen, Mohr, 1972, p. 318.
9 This is taken as the core function of separation of powers.While it is not disputed that the principle
may strengthen other principles such as the rule of law and the principle of democracy, these three
principles should be kept distinct and do not depend on or require each other.
10 R. Dehousse, ‘Comparing National and EC Law: The Problem of the Level of Analysis’, (1994) 42
Am. J. Comp. L. 4, pp. 776–777.
11 K. Lenaerts & M. Desomer,‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? Simplification
of Legal Instruments and Procedures’, (2005) 11 ELJ 6, p. 764.
12 G. Nicolaysen, ‘Rechtsprechung: Öffentliche Unternehmen,Transparenz der finanziellen Beziehungen
zum Staat’, (1983) 18 Europarecht 1, p. 61.
13 Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, France, Italy & UK v. Commission, [1982] ECR 2545, para. 6.
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show however, is that powers in the EU have not been functionally and
institutionally separated along the same lines.
The confusion over the question whether the principle of separation of
powers is relevant to the EU may probably be traced back to two implicit
assumptions. Pescatore’s conclusion on the relevance of the principle for the EU is
illustrative in this regard: ‘la doctrine “tripartite” de la séparation des pouvoirs
n’est pas un principe d’explication valable pour un ensemble transnational tel que
les Communautés européennes’.14 First, this assumes that the principle of
separation of powers dictates the functional tripartite should be matched by an
organic tripartite. Second, the principle is taken to be an explanatory principle.
However, both assumptions may be questioned. First, the principle merely dictates
that the three different functional powers should be separated, but not that this
functional separation should be matched by an identical organizational separation.
Second, the principle is not explanatory but prescriptive in nature.Whether or not
one can make sense of the EU, looking at it from a separation of powers
perspective has no bearing on its relevance for the EU.
Therefore, even if the Court would rule that the principle of separation of
powers does not exist in the EU legal order, this would still not solve in the
negative the question of the principle’s relevance for the EU. However, it would be
an important element in answering the question whether the EU pays respect to
the principle, a question which will not be dealt with here.15
As regards the relation between the separation of powers and the institutional
balance, the viewpoint of Guillermin, is endorsed here.The analogy between both
concepts centres around their objective of power-sharing. Both the separation of
powers and the institutional balance have a normative dimension mandating that
public authority should be dispersed among a number of actors.16 The reason why
both may nevertheless not be assimilated is twofold. First, on a substantive level,
the institutional balance aims to represent different interests united in the EU
polity and therefore divides public authority between different institutions
representing different interests. The separation of powers, however, aims to secure
individual freedom by dividing public authority between a number of different
actors. Second, both concepts operate at different levels.Whereas the separation of
powers is a politico-philosophical principle relevant to every polity conceivable,
the institutional balance is the product itself of a specific polity. Thus, where in a
comparative law exercise different polities may be gauged by the abstract principle
14 P. Pescatore, ‘L’Executif Communautaire: Justification du Quadripartisme institue par les Traités de
Paris et de Rome’, (1978) 14 CDE 4, p. 388.
15 On this, see Conway, supra n. 2; K. Lenaerts, ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the
European Community’, (1991) 28 CMLRev. 1.
16 Guillermin, supra n. 6, p. 344.
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of separation of powers, this is not the case for the institutional balance. Since the
institutional balance flows from the Treaties, it does not exist in the abstract, but is
a product of the EU legal order, which as a result cannot be gauged using an
independent notion of institutional balance.
Both concepts should therefore be kept distinct and as a result, both are
relevant to the EU independently from each other. Whereas the separation of
powers is relevant to evaluate both the legal architecture and political functioning
of the EU, the institutional balance is only useful in evaluating the political
functioning of the EU and the resulting legal architecture laid down in secondary
law. Now that it is determined that both notions are relevant to the EU, it is
necessary to look more closely into the notion of institutional balance.
3 THE NOTION OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
The ‘notion’ of institutional balance which may be found in Article 13 TEU refers
to ‘a system for distributing powers among the different Community institutions,
assigning to each institution its own role in the institutional structure of the
Community and the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community’.17
However, this notion, also called the ‘principle of institutional balance’ has not
been spared from academic critique. Indeed it has even been raised that in fact it is
no principle at all.
According to Tridimas, ‘a principle must be judged on the basis of two
parameters: the intrinsic value of the right that it embodies, and how well it
structures the judicial inquiry’.18 These two parameters signify that if the
institutional balance is to be a genuine principle of EU law, it should have a
sufficiently clear content which guides the Court and helps it in solving legal
issues brought before it.The requirement of a sufficiently clear content should not
be understood as a rejection of the traditional differentiation between a rule,
which if applied automatically results in a solution, and a principle, which
underpins and justifies concrete rules but does not in itself and automatically result
in a solution to a given problem. Rather it should be seen as conditional to the
principle’s workability for the European judge.
Obviously the institutional balance should not only have a sufficient content
which guides the judiciary in order to qualify as a principle. It should also be
shown that a principle of institutional balance, while in itself unwritten and rather
abstract, underpins certain specific rules.
17 Case C-316/91, Parliament v. Council, [1994] ECR I-625, para. 11.
18 T.Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 2.
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According to von Bogdandy, the institutional balance guarantees the ‘strings of
accountability’ (Verantwortungsstränge) and the observance of procedural rules
without it being a genuine clear principle (yet), since the provisions on the
competences and the cooperation between the different institutions are too
complex and divergent.19 Chalmers does not claim as forcefully as von Bogdandy
that the institutional balance is not a principle but he is of the opinion that the
Court of Justice should take on a more assertive stance in inter-institutional
conflicts to uphold the institutional balance and be more receptive when it is
raised in preliminary procedures, if the institutional balance is to be deserving of
the title of legal principle rather than ‘a bat for EU institutions to swat each other
with’.20 According to de Witte, the Treaties give very detailed guidance in respect
of the horizontal relations between the institutions, so much so that it might be
said there is no place for a (judge-made) principle governing these horizontal
relations. This would imply that the institutional balance is not a principle but a
mere shorthand for the rules which apply in a specific case.21 Similar observations
were made by Prechal although she still sees an important role for the institutional
balance as gap-filling principle, since the rules governing the position of the
separate institutions and the relations between them are not always clear.22
De Witte and Prechal seem diametrically opposed on the clarity of the rules
governing the inter-institutional relations. Although it is true that the horizontal
relations between the institutions are detailed, this is foremost so for the legislative
process and because this process is quite complex. This complexity necessitates
detailed guidance in primary law, but it still leaves ‘grey zones’ (cf. infra).
Furthermore the guidance is much less detailed when looking at the horizontal
relations in the executive sphere, e.g., the external representation and
implementation of legislation. What is more, given the fast pace of successive
Treaty revisions, there does seem to be some potential in the gap-filling function as
proposed by Prechal.
Bieber also criticized the notion of institutional balance as an unworkable
concept for the purpose of interpreting EU law as it presupposes a definitively and
completely ordered system of treaties, which they were not at the time (or
today).23 This of course assumes that the ‘balance’ in the institutional balance is
19 A. von Bogdandy, EuropäischeVerfassungsrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003, p. 199.
20 D. Chalmers, ‘Justifying Institutional Accomodation’, (2008) 33 ELRev. 4, p. 456.
21 B. de Witte, ‘Institutional Principles: A Special Category of General Principles of EC Law’, in Bernitz
& Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 2000, pp. 150–151. However, de Witte does make an exception for the Chernobyl case
law of the Court.
22 Prechal, supra n. 4, pp. 277–278.
23 R. Bieber, ‘The Settlement of Institutional Conflicts on the Basis of Article 4 of the EEC Treaty’,
(1984) 21 CMLRev. 3, p. 509.
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somehow exogenous to the Treaties, while in fact the institutional balance only
exists because and through the Treaties.
Lenaerts and Verhoeven, however, do make the case for the institutional
balance as a principle of EU governance, although they see more potential in the
institutional balance as a political principle than as a legal principle.That political
principle ‘requires the makers of the European constitution to shape institutions
and the interactions between them in such a manner that each interest and
constituency present in the Union is duly represented and co-operates with others
in the frame of an institutionalized debate geared towards the formulation of the
common good’.24
The institutional balance as a political principle put forward by Lenaerts and
Verhoeven again shows the difficult relation between the notion of institutional
balance and the principle of separation of powers. Essentially Lenaerts and
Verhoeven propose there is an abstract balance which the Treaty Drafters
themselves should take into account when drafting new Treaties or Treaty
amendments. Because of the resemblance with an abstract separation of powers
which may serve as a guide to drafters of constitutional law, this political
‘institutional balance’ has a certain appeal but Lenaerts and Verhoeven do not
clarify how this political principle would work in practice. How does one decide
which interests should participate in the institutionalized debate and how much
weight they should be accorded? It is unclear how a self-standing political
principle of institutional balance would resolve these issues. In the following parts,
any reference to the institutional balance then is a reference to the legal notion or
principle of institutional balance.
According to Lenaerts and Verhoeven, there is a legal principle of institutional
balance but its function is more limited than that of its political counterpart.The
three rules which they derive from the principle are the following: (i) each
institution should enjoy a sufficient independence in order to exercise its powers;
(ii) institutions should not unconditionally assign their powers to other institutions
and (iii) institutions may not in the exercise of their own powers encroach on the
powers and prerogatives of other institutions.25
Following Lenaerts and Verhoeven, these rules can be distilled from the case
law of the Court, even if this exercise is troubled by the terminology of the Court
which is still in flux. Thus Lenaerts and Verhoeven claim that ‘[t]he term
institutional balance was used for the first time by the Court of Justice in
24 K. Lenaerts & A.Verhoeven, ‘Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance’,
in Joerges & Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001, p. 47.
25 Ibid., pp. 44–45.
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Meroni’.26 In reality the Court in Meroni referred to the term ‘the balance of
powers’27 and how both relate to each other may be debated.28 At the same time,
the Court’s more recent settling on the ‘institutional balance’ could perhaps be
seen as proof of its maturing case law on the institutional balance. Even if the
substantive content of the notion remains an open question, it might be said at
least its name has ‘crystallized’.
3.1 A VERTICAL DIMENSION TO THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE?
So far, Lenaerts and Verhoeven have been among the few to try and map out the
content of the institutional balance in detail, making it unclear whether the three
rules they deduced are accepted by other authors. Some, however, have implicitly
argued for a fourth rule to be added to those of Lenaerts and Verhoeven, arguing
that there is also a vertical dimension to the institutional balance.According toVos
the institutional balance enshrines a strict division of powers between the
institutions which can be seen as a reflection of the Member States’ concern that
the integrity of their powers be maintained. The notion of institutional balance
should then be defined widely, encompassing the vertical relation between the
Union and the Member States.According toVos, this would explain why Member
States and their national institutions do not only need a say over the legislative
process at EU level, but also over the implementation of EU law.29 However, given
that the institutional balance would be a judge-made principle such a function of
the institutional balance may be deemed doubtful. Even if the reference to the
institutional balance in the Protocol on the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality added to the Amsterdam Treaty could have been
interpreted as supporting such a vertical dimension of the notion,30 it should be
noted this reference has been deleted by the Lisbon Treaty.31
26 Ibid., p. 36.
27 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgische S.p.A. v. High Authority, [1957-1958] ECR 133, p. 151.
28 The Court did appear to use both concepts interchangeably in para. 41 of the FNAB judgment (see
infra) but only to refute an argument of the applicant which has not been reproduced in the Court’s
judgment. Furthermore, in relation to another plea it is clear from the judgment the applicant relied
on the Court’s definition of ‘institutional balance’ in Chernobyl and not the ‘balance of powers’. This
because even if one assumes both concepts are linked, the Court added important ‘content’ to the
concept in Chernobyl, which was not clear from Meroni and which was necessary for the applicant’s
case.
29 E.Vos, ‘The Rise of Committees’, (1997) 3 ELJ 3, p. 223.
30 Paragraph 2 of the Protocol provided: ‘The application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
shall respect the general provisions and the objectives of the Treaty, particularly as regards the maintaining in full of
the acquis communautaire and the institutional balance.’
31 Vos is not alone in her claim. See for instance D. Fischer-Appelt, Agenturen der Europäischen
Gemeinschaft: eine Studie zu Rechtsproblemen, Legitimation und Kontrolle europäischer Agenturen mit
interdisziplinären und rechtsvergleichenden Bezügen, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1999, p. 169.
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Since the principle of attribution of powers applies to both the legislative and
the executive sphere, it is unclear why recourse to the institutional balance would
be necessary to solve these vertical power-delimitation problems. It could of
course be argued that the notion of institutional balance is the horizontal
expression of the principle of attribution of powers,32 but this would not sit well
with the Court’s apparent emphasis on that notion being a principle in its own
right.33
A vertical dimension to the institutional balance is not immediately clear from
the Court’s jurisprudence either. In Région Wallone v. Commission, the Court by
reasoned order noted that subnational entities of Member States did not have the
same status as the Member States themselves in proceedings since otherwise ‘it
would undermine the institutional balance provided for by the Treaties, which,
inter alia, govern the conditions under which the Member States, that is to say, the
States party to the Treaties establishing the Communities and the Accession
Treaties, participate in the functioning of the Community institutions’.34
However, the reference to the institutional balance in this passage was
criticized by Le Bot who rightly found that the institutional balance is ill-suited to
deal with an issue which actually relates to a problem of the unity of the national
state.35
Any hopes that this would allow the Member States to successfully rely on the
institutional balance in Court were also soon shattered. In the Tobacco case, the
German government argued that the institutional balance was jeopardized because
Directive 2001/37 had been adopted under the co-decision procedure while it
was also based on Article 133 EEC.AG Geelhoed dealt with the argument on the
institutional balance in an unconvincing manner,36 while the Court simply held
that the Directive could have been adopted on the single legal base of Article 95
EC and proceeded by dismissing the argument of the German government,
stating:
The argument that application of the co-decision procedure in the adoption of a measure
concerning the common commercial policy is contrary to the separation of powers
between institutions intended by the Treaty is in any event without any bearing in the
32 Priebe has put forward such an argument, see R. Priebe, Entscheidungsbefugnisse vertragsfremder
Einrichtungen im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1979, pp. 75–78.
33 The Court did so in Case C-133/06, Parliament v. Council, [2008] ECR I-3189, para. 57.
34 Case C-95/97, Région wallonne v. Commission, [1997] ECR I-1787.
35 F. Le Bot, Le principe de l’équilibre institutionnel en droit de l’union européenne, Paris, Université
Panthéon-Assas, 2012, PhD Thesis, pp. 126–129.
36 The AG found that through the institutional balance ‘the Court establishes a direct link with the prerogatives
of the European Parliament and the democratic principles underlying them’.The conclusion which flows from
this premise obviously is that the co-decision procedure was correctly used, since enforcing such an
institutional balance would resolve any and every conflict in favour of the Parliament.
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circumstances since […] the Directive is not an act which must be adopted on the basis of
Article 133 EC.37
In Commission v. Portugal, the defendant relied on the institutional balance to
argue that each Member State is itself responsible for defining the measures which
it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, so
that it need not pay customs duties on imported armaments, pursuant to Article
346 TFEU.38 If such a direct vertical dimension of the institutional balance had
been accepted, this would have come close to Vos’ argument for a direct vertical
dimension to the institutional balance,39 but the Court dismissed this argument,
without commenting on the institutional balance, by stating that Article 346
TFEU cannot be read as allowing a Member State to derogate from the Treaties by
relying on no more than its essential security interests.40
A vertical function of the institutional balance was also rejected by AG Poiares
Maduro in his conclusion to the Waste Shipments case. In that case the correct legal
basis of Regulation 1013/2006 on shipments of waste was at issue. The
Commission argued that the Regulation should have been adopted on the basis of
Articles 175 and 133 EC (current Articles 192 and 207 TFEU) instead of solely on
the former Article as the legislator had done. The AG remarked that the
disagreement on the legal basis did not affect the institutional balance because
either way, the procedure to adopt the Regulation would have remained the
same.41 However, he remarked that the true repercussions of the problem lay in
the distribution of competences between the Union and the Member States,
which would be greatly altered if the measure should also have been adopted on
Article 133 EC conferring exclusive competence on the Union.42 By neatly
distinguishing the legal consequences hidden behind the controversy between the
Commission and the Council and Parliament, the AG in effect excluded a possible
direct vertical dimension to the institutional balance. Furthermore, his strict
reasoning also argues against the view that the institutional balance is (merely) a
horizontal expression of the principle of attribution of powers.43
37 Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte: British American Tobacco (Investments)
Ltd and others, [2002] ECR I-11453, para. 110.
38 Case C-38/06, Commission v. Portugal, [2010] ECR I-1569, para. 49.
39 See supra n. 29.
40 Case C-38/06, Commission v. Portugal, [2010] ECR I-1569, para. 64.
41 Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Case C-411/06, Commission of the European Communities v. European
Parliament and Council of the European Union, [2009] ECR I-7585, para. 6.
42 Ibid., para. 7.
43 See Priebe supra n. 32.
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4 THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE:AN ACTIONABLE PRINCIPLE IN
THE EU LEGAL ORDER?
The Court’s judgments in cases such as Isoglucose44 and Chernobyl in the 1980s
appeared to make a link between the institutional balance and a principle of
democracy, but as Le Bot has argued, while enforcing the institutional balance
might promote democratic decision-making in certain cases, this is only
incidentally so.45
Still, Chernobyl is arguably the most important institutional balance case to this
date. In Comitology the same question as the one in Chernobyl had been put to the
Court, but the Parliament was denied active locus standi under Article 173 EEC. In
reply to the Parliament’s claim that it would not be able to defend its prerogatives
without the power to bring action for annulments, the Court declared that other
means for review were still available.46 In Chernobyl, two years later, the Court
reconsidered its earlier judgment and followed the Parliament’s original reasoning.
The Court then also further clarified the notion of institutional balance, stating:
Th[e] prerogatives [of the European Parliament] are one of the elements of the
institutional balance created by the Treaties. The Treaties set up a system for distributing
powers among the different Community institutions, assigning to each institution its own
role in the institutional structure of the Community and the accomplishment of the tasks
entrusted to the Community.
Observance of the institutional balance means that each of the institutions must
exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions. It also requires
that it should be possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur.
The Court, which under the Treaties has the task of ensuring that in the interpretation
and application of the Treaties the law is observed, must therefore be able to maintain the
institutional balance and, consequently, review the observance of the Parliament’s
prerogatives when called upon to do so by the Parliament, by means of a legal remedy
which is suited to the purpose which the Parliament seeks to achieve.47
Interestingly enough, the Court justified this contra legem (or praeter legem)48
interpretation of the Treaties by pointing to the need to maintain the institutional
balance while AG Van Gerven in his opinion to the case took special effort to
avoid this issue by making a distinction between adjusting or re-establishing the
institutional balance and upholding an adequate and coherent system of legal
protection. According to the AG, Comitology constituted a ‘refusal by the Court to
44 Case 138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council, [1980] ECR 3333, para. 33.
45 Le Bot, supra n. 35, p. 243.
46 Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council, [1988] ECR 5615, para. 27.
47 Case 70/88, Parliament v. Council, [1990] ECR I-2041, paras 21-3.
48 See AG Mengozzi’s juxtaposition of an enlarged jurisdiction of the Court in Chernobyl through a wide
or praeter legem interpretation of the Treaties against a contra legem interpretation of the Treaties which
would give the Court jurisdiction over JHA matters pre-Lisbon. Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case
C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía, and others v. Council, [2007] ECR I-1579, paras 168–173.
THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, AN ILL-FATED PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW? 381
accede to the Parliament’s request to alter the institutional balance in its favour’
because such a move did not belong to the province of the courts. However,
ensuring the Parliament enjoys effective legal protection was a task for the Court.
Thus, by narrowing the issue down to a problem of legal protection, AG Van
Gerven cleverly succeeded in presenting a workable solution without having to
get into the repercussions of his solution on the institutional balance.49 The Court
reached more or less the same result but did not rely so much on the narrowed
down argument of effective legal protection, rather it emphasized the fundamental
interest in maintaining and observing the institutional balance.Thus, granting the
European Parliament (limited) locus standi against the wording of the Treaties did
not upset the institutional balance, a question the AG was keen on avoiding, but
was actually necessary to uphold the institutional balance.
Following the ground-breaking ruling in Chernobyl, a lot of private parties
then started to invoke the institutional balance in their pleadings.50 Because the
Court in Meroni had emphasized the protective function of the balance of powers
between the institutions, holding that the ‘balance of powers which is
characteristic of the institutional structure of the Community [is] a fundamental
guarantee granted by the Treaty in particular to the undertakings and associations
of undertakings to which it applies’51 it would seem that the institutional balance
as a principle could indeed be invoked by private litigants to safeguard their
interests.
However, the hopes of these private litigants were quickly shattered,52 since in
Vreugdenhil the Court ruled that ‘the aim of the system of the division of powers
between the various Community institutions is to ensure that the balance between
the institutions provided for in the Treaty is maintained, and not to protect
individuals’.53
The institutional balance losing its protective function to the benefit of
private parties was further confirmed in British Steel v. Commission.54 This was of
49 Opinion of Advocate GeneralVan Gerven in Case C-70/88, Parliament v. Council, [1990] ECR I-2041.
50 Apart from Vreugdenhil and British Steel, private parties unsuccessfully relied on the institutional
balance in, i.a., the following cases: Case C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v. Council, [2001] ECR I-8973;
Case C-345/00 P, FNAB and others v. Council, [2001] ECR I-3811; Joined Cases T-377/00,T-379/00,
T-380/00,T-260/01 & T-272/01, Phillip Morris International and others v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-1,
para. 87. Case C-301/02 P, Carmine SalvatoreTralli v. ECB, [2005] ECR I-4071.
51 Case 9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgische S.p.A. v. High Authority, [1957–1958] ECR 133.
52 In this vein see also V. Constantinesco, ‘Jurisprudence – Recours en indemnité’, (1993) 120 Journal du
droit international 2, p. 405.
53 Case C-282/90, Industrie- en Handelsonderneming Vreugdenhil BV v. Commission, [1992] ECR I-1937.
See also Opinion of AG Darmon in Case C-282/90, Industrie- en HandelsondernemingVreugdenhil BV v.
Commission, [1992] ECR I-1937, para. 38.
54 Case T-243/94, British Steel plc v. Commission, [1997] ECR II-1887.
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course a significant shift, since this protective function was the institutional
balance’s original core function.
In Tralli, where the applicant’s argument was much less convincing than that
in British Steel, the Court dismissed the plea concerning the institutional balance
by noting that ‘it is sufficient to recall that that principle is intended to apply only
to relations between Community institutions and bodies’.55 Although this would
not a fortiori mean that Member States might not have an interest in requesting the
Court to uphold the institutional balance, the Court has treated them much the
same like private litigants invoking the institutional balance, rejecting or ignoring
their arguments.56 What is more, despite its statement in Tralli, the Court has even
been equally unreceptive to institutional balance arguments put forward by the
institutions themselves.57 In fact, the only time where the institutional balance has
played any meaningful role in the Court’s reasoning is where the Court invoked it
itself to substantiate its reasoning.58
It requires no explanation that the Court’s treatment of these institutional
balance arguments raised by different kinds of parties, privileged and
non-privileged alike, does not sit well with the Court’s own explicit confirmation
of the existence of a ‘principle of institutional balance’.59 It is granted, a significant
number of the institutional balance arguments raised before the Court appear
rather frivolous, last-ditch attempts by a party to swing the case in its advantage.
However, this does not relieve the Court of the duty to deal in a satisfactory
manner with such arguments. Quite the opposite, if the Court stands by its
qualification of the institutional balance as a principle of EU law, it should deal
forcefully with these arguments, since parties should not be allowed to trifle with
fundamental legal principles.
55 Tralli v. ECB, para. 46. That EU bodies are required to respect the institutional balance seems clear,
whether EU bodies which are not EU institutions should themselves come under the institutional
balance is a different matter. In Elio Fiorucci v. OHIM the General Court appeared to rule so, see Case
T-165/06, Elio Fiorucci v. OHIM, [2009] ECR II-1375, para. 67. However since the Court in Chernobyl
has ruled that the institutional balance is laid down in the Treaties it would a fortiori not encompass
bodies which are not explicitly provided for under the Treaties.
56 See i.a., Case C-240/90, Germany v. Commission, [1992] ECR I-5383; Joined Cases C-46/93 &
C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v. Secretary of State for
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, [1996] ECR I-1029; Case C-58/94, Netherlands v. Council,
[1996] ECR I-2169; Case C-239/01, Germany v. Commission, [2003] ECR I-10333; Case C-491/01,
The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte: British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and others,
[2002] ECR I-11453.
57 See Case C-533/03, Commission v. Council, [2006] ECR I-1025; Case C-77/11, Council v. Parliament,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:559.
58 See, e.g., Case 415/85, Commission v. Ireland, [1988] ECR 3097, para. 9; Case C-95/97, Région wallonne
v. Commission, [1997] ECR I-1787; Case T-474/04, Pergan Hilfsstoffe v. Commission, [2007] ECR
II-4225, para. 77; Case C-133/06, Parliament v. Council, [2008] ECR I-3189, paras 56-7.
59 See supra n. 33 (emphasis added).
THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE, AN ILL-FATED PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW? 383
5 A POSSIBLE FUNCTION OF A PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL
BALANCE
Supposing the notion of institutional balance which may be found in Article 13
TEU is indeed deserving of the qualification of being a principle of EU law, what
then is the principle’s function? There appears to be at least two rivalling
contenders.
In Audiolux, AG Trstenjak expressed a (modern) function of the institutional
balance rather clearly and at the same time setting the principle apart from the
separation of powers:
The institutional balance within the Community is not based on the principle
of the separation of powers in the constitutional-law sense, but on a principle of
the separation of functions, whereby the Community’s functions are intended to
be exercised by the organs which are best placed to perform them under the
Treaties. Unlike the principle of the separation of powers, which seeks partly to
ensure that the individual is protected by moderating state power, the principle of
the separation of functions is intended to ensure that the Community’s aims are
effectively achieved.60
While the AG’s distinction between the two principles can only be supported,
it should be noted that the principle of separation of powers could also be traced
to a doctrine promoting efficiency.61 As Le Bot has argued, the function of the
institutional balance rather seems to be to protect the fundamental elements in the
institutional system of the EU, i.e., a function of systemic protection (une fonction de
protection systémique).62
At least this is what appears from the Court’s jurisprudence in which the
institutional balance was indeed enforced as a legal principle. Apart from the
Chernobyl case already discussed above, the institutional balance also figured as a
principle in France v. Commission. In that case the competence of the Commission
under Article 218 TFEU to conclude guidelines on regulatory cooperation with a
third state was at issue. Although the Court concluded that the guidelines did not
fall within the scope of Article 218 TFEU given they were non-binding, it
immediately added:
Nevertheless, this judgment cannot be construed as upholding the Commission’s
argument that the fact that a measure such as the Guidelines is not binding is sufficient to
confer on that institution the competence to adopt it. Determining the conditions under
which such a measure may be adopted requires that the division of powers and the
60 Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in Case C-101/08, Audiolux e.a., [2009] ECR I-9823, para.
104.
61 See, e.g., N. Barber, ‘Prelude to the Separation of Powers’, (2001) 60 Cambridge L. J. 1, pp. 59–88.
62 Le Bot, supra n. 35, p. 243.
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institutional balance established by the Treaty in the field of the common commercial
policy be duly taken into account, since in this case the measure seeks to reduce the risk
of conflict related to the existence of technical barriers to trade in goods.63
Lavranos and van Ooik have called this part of the Court’s judgment
‘mystical’,64 the Court commenting on a plea which was not raised. According to
Mortelmans, the Court did so to make clear that it does not wish to extend the
Commission’s external powers.65 The Court probably also wished to prevent a
‘grey zone’ from emerging as regards to the possibility to adopt ‘soft law’.
Although the Court saw its intervention as a clarification, it actually raised more
questions than were answered. Pitschas notes that the Court accorded legal
significance to the Guidelines even though they were non-binding, without
clarifying what the nature of this legal significance is.66 The Court probably feared
that in casu the Commission, but in general also other institutions, could construct
a whole system of acts which were non-binding given the lack of formal
competence for the adoption of such acts but which, as a result from their
non-binding nature, would also be immune from scrutiny. An elaborated body of
such non-binding acts could also upset the institutional balance because it could
pre-empt the de facto, but not de iure, discretion which other institutions enjoy in
subsequent rulemaking. According to Baroncini, the Court also wanted to secure
its own jurisdiction over such instruments of international administrative
cooperation, notwithstanding their non-binding nature.67
In both Chernobyl and France v. Commission, the Court therefore used the
institutional balance as a gap-filling principle. Generally two situations may be
thought of where the institutional balance could then be relied upon.This is the
case following a new Treaty (amendment) where the Treaty only lays down general
rules and no consensus can be agreed on how these rules should be understood,
resulting in litigation before the Court. In deciding between rival interpretations
the Court could then refer to the institutional balance. A second type of situation
is when a given institutional practice or development does not find its origins in
the Treaties but finds itself in a ‘grey zone’.68 In the past this has for instance been
63 Case C-233/02, France v. Commission, [2004] ECR I-2759, para. 40.
64 N. Lavranos & R. van Ooik, ‘Zaak C-233/02 Franse Republiek t. Commissie van de Europese
Gemeenschappen (“EG-VS Richtsnoeren”)’, (2004) Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 12,
p. 447.
65 K. Mortelmans, ‘De handelspolitieke bevoegdheden van de Europese Commissie’, (2004) Ars Aequi,
p. 455.
66 C. Pitschas, ‘Keine Verletzung des Monopols zur Gesetzesinitiative der Kommission durch nicht
bindende Leitlinien’, (2004) 15 EuZW 14, p. 435.
67 E. Baroncini, ‘La Cour de Justice et le treaty making power de la Commission européenne’, (2006)
RDUE 2, p. 417.
68 In relation to the ECJ’s powers under the TSCG (cf. infra) Beukers has made the argument to apply
the principle (instead of the notion) of institutional balance, to conclude on the compatibility of the
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the case for the comitology system, which the Court sanctioned in a number of
cases, starting with Köster.69 Since such institutional practice often rests on an
inter-institutional consensus, challenging it will depend on private parties (or
Member States), again stressing the need to allow private parties (and Member
States) to rely on the institutional balance as a principle before the Court.
Because the principle’s function would be gap-filling, as Prechal suggested (cf.
supra) one would not need to rely on it to solve certain common problems. For
instance, in inter-institutional conflicts on the correct legal base of a legislative
measure, the Court will almost never have to rely on the principle of institutional
balance to rule on the case, given that the provisions of the Treaties are often
detailed and relatively clear on this issue, and need only to be applied by the Court
together with the centre of gravity and absorption doctrines, something which de
Witte alluded to.70 Any references to the institutional balance in such cases are
superfluous then. However, the institutional balance could be used as a defining
principle in those cases for which the express Treaty provisions do not give
sufficient guidance.
Under an institutional balance analysis the first step should thus be to
determine whether the principle of institutional balance may be invoked at all. If
the Treaty provisions themselves provide sufficient guidance, reference to the
institutional balance is unnecessary and the Court should resolve the case by
applying and interpreting the specific Treaty provisions.
However, if the Court concludes that the Treaty provisions provide
insufficient guidance it could proceed by putting the contested power into the
legal context as it results from the Treaties. Here the Court could employ its whole
arsenal of interpretative techniques and especially those of systemic, purposive
interpretation also taking into account ‘genetic’ and historical arguments, by
relying on the genesis of Treaty provisions and the travaux préparatoires.71
Next it could be verified what the effect would be if the contested power
would be sanctioned or rebuked: whether this would unduly restrict the
independence of other institutions in the exercise of their powers, whether it
would result in an impermissible delegation or whether it would encroach upon
the powers and prerogatives of other institutions.
This approach is also confirmed in the two cases in which the institutional
balance figured as a principle. In Chernobyl, the Court was confronted with a
TSCG with the EU Treaties. See T. Beukers, ‘The Eurozone Crisis and the Legitimacy of
Differentiated Integration’, in de Witte, Héritier & Trechsel, The Euro Crisis and the State of European
Democracy, EUI, p. 21.
69 Case 25/70, Köster [1970] ECR 1161.
70 See supra n. 21.
71 On the different techniques see G. Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU, Oxford,
Hart Publishing, 2013, pp. 187–233.
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discrepancy between the Treaty provisions following the SEA. On the one hand,
Article 100a EEC provided in the cooperation procedure to adopt legislation,
granting new powers to the Parliament. On the other hand, Article 173 EEC still
did not allow the Parliament to challenge acts of the Council and Commission,
potentially rendering nugatory its new prerogatives in the legislative procedure.
The Court had to put this power claimed by the Parliament in its context.This is
something AG Darmon did extensively in his opinion in Comitology,72 presenting
an overview of the position (at that time) of the European Parliament in
proceedings before the Court: the Parliament’s right to intervene as laid down in
Isoglucose, the Parliament’s privileged position under Article 175 EEC (current
Article 265 TFEU) as confirmed in Common Transport Policy,73 the obligation on
the Parliament to supply the Court with information in preliminary rulings
(although the Statute at that time only laid down this obligation vis-à-vis the
Member States, Council and Commission)74 and the Parliament’s passive locus
standi under Article 173 EEC as established in Les Verts.75 In a third step the Court
looked at the effect of, in this case, withholding such a power to the Parliament
and had to conclude that this would result in the inability of the European
Parliament to safeguard the prerogatives it had acquired under Article 100a EEC.
In France v. Commission, the possibility for the Commission to autonomously
conclude non-binding agreements with third countries was at issue, since it had
already been decided that the Commission could not autonomously conclude
binding agreements. This power had to be put further into the context of the
Commission’s autonomous international function. Undoubtedly the possibility of
some autonomy for the Commission in this field was not completely exotic.76 The
Court therefore had to look further into the effects of granting such a power to
the Commission. For the reasons set out above, the Court could have felt such a
power might upset the institutional balance, as the Commission could otherwise
escape the jurisdiction of the Court by adopting soft law agreements and at the
same time narrowing the de facto discretion of the other institutions (in casu the
Council) to adopt hard law, encroaching on that institution’s prerogatives.
72 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council, [1988] ECR 5615,
para. 3.
73 Case 13/83, Parliament v. Council, [1985] ECR 1513.
74 Case 20/85, Roviello v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben, [1988] ECR 2805. See also other cases cited
by AG Darmon in his opinion referred to supra n. 72.
75 Case 294/83, Parti écologiste ‘LesVerts’ v. Parliament, [1986] ECR 1339.
76 See Baroncini, supra n. 67, pp. 371–374.
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6 PROSPECTS FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
While the principle of institutional balance qualified as a principle of systemic
protection could fulfil an important function, it is under serious pressure.
As discussed above, the Court has treated its own judge-made principle in a
rather step-motherly way, or as Le Bot puts it more euphemistically, the Court has
not yet drawn all the necessary conclusions from its qualification of the
institutional balance as a principle of EU law.77 In addition to this, there are the
significant transmutations which in recent years have affected the very foundations
of the EU legal order and this under a manifest absence of any institutional
balance considerations.78
Although these cases cannot be elaborated, it suffices to note that following
and during the continuing euro crisis, the European Council has taken up a role
which goes beyond providing ‘the necessary impetus for the EU’s development’ as
prescribed in Article 15 TEU, which undoubtedly affects the prerogatives of the
institutions which are involved in (legislative) decision-making.To tackle the euro
crisis, the Member States have also fallen back on intergovernmental recipes
outside the EU Treaties such as the European Financial Stability Facility, the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). Through the
Euro-Plus Pact they have relied on the open method of coordination which acts as
an alternative to the traditional ‘community method’ and for which there is only a
clear legal basis in the Treaties in the social sphere.79
Following the conclusion of the TSCG, Craig forcefully set out why it is not
only problematic that EU institutions are granted new powers outside the EU
Treaties but why it is also questionable for EU institutions to use already existing
powers, under the EU Treaties, in a legal framework exogenous to that of the
EU.80 This issue was dealt with in relation to the ESM in Pringle,81 even if the
Court avoided reference to the institutional balance in that case. Still, the Court
did set an institutional balance limit since the involvement of EU institutions
under an arrangement outside the EU Treaties may ‘not alter the essential character
of the powers conferred on those institutions by the EU and FEU Treaties’.82
77 Le Bot, supra n. 35, p. 298.
78 On the side-lining of the institutional balance in the EU’s response to the euro crisis, see M. Dawson
& F. de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis’, (2013) 76 The Modern Law
Review 5, pp. 828–836.
79 See Art. 156 TFEU.
80 P. Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism’,
(2012) 37 ELRev. 3, pp. 241–245.
81 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.
82 Ibid., para. 162.
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However, from an institutional balance perspective it is unclear why this
pre-condition is merely limited to the ‘essential character’ of the institutions’
powers and this even apart from the difficult question of distinguishing between
the essential and non-essential characteristics of the institutions’ powers.Again, this
was forcefully noted by Craig in a comment to the Pringle case.83 The Court in
Pringle further only scrutinized the Commission’s and the ECB’s powers under the
ESM, without verifying how these powers under the ESM would affect the other
EU institutions’ powers under the EU Treaties.84
The same issue may be noted in relation to the EU’s tackling of the financial
crisis. Here the EU legislator decided in 2010 to establish three agencies, the
supervisory authorities in the financial sector.These agencies were provided with
unprecedented powers, in themselves questionable under an institutional balance
perspective,85 which have been further extended in subsequent legislation. Under
Regulation 236/2012, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
has even been granted the power to ban, or impose conditions, on the shorting of
financial instruments, which led the UK to challenge this specific power before the
Court in Short-selling.86 One of the arguments made by the UK was that the
ESMA had been empowered to adopt implementing acts, whereas the power to do
so is reserved to the Commission by Article 291 TFEU.While this question went
to the core of the institutional balance, since it touches upon one of the essential
characteristics of the Commission’s powers,87 the Court managed to dismiss this
and all other pleas of the UK without referring to the institutional balance one
single time. Had it done so it would have been forced to explicitly argue why the
Commission’s prerogatives under the Treaties are not jeopardized by the legislator
when the latter establishes a new executive body, granting it powers which the
Treaties prima facie confer on the Commission.88
83 P. Craig, ‘“Pringle” and Use of EU Institutions Outside the EU Legal Framework: Foundations,
Procedure and Substance’, (2013) 9 EuConst 2, pp. 277–278.
84 On this see also Craig, supra n. 83, p. 271; Beukers, supra n. 68, pp. 25–27.
85 See M. Chamon, ‘EU Agencies between “Meroni” and “Romano” or the Devil and the Deep Blue
Sea’, (2011) 48 CMLRev. 4, pp. 1068–1070.
86 Case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.
87 Article 17 TEU provides that the Commission ‘shall ensure the application of the Treaties, and of measures
adopted by the institutions pursuant to them […] It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management
functions, as laid down in the Treaties’. (emphasis added) Even if the Court seems to have ruled otherwise,
it seems difficult to deny that Art. 291 TFEU places special importance on the Commission as the
primary executive actor at EU level.
88 For a discussion of this case and a critique on the Court’s lack of attention to the Commission’s
prerogatives as protected by the institutional balance, see M. Chamon, ‘The empowerment of agencies
under the Meroni doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: comment on United Kingdom v. Parliament and
Council (Short-selling) and the Proposed Single Resolution Mechanism’ (2014) 39 ELRev. 3, pp.
380–403; also published in (2014) European Current Law 8, pp. 869–894.
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These two recent cases do not provide bright prospects for the principle of
institutional balance.89 However, they would not have been the ideal test cases to
experiment with a rigorous institutional balance scrutiny either. As one
commentator observed (albeit only in relation to Short-selling) such an approach
could have amounted to ‘foolish judicial disregard for the vital need to ensure
continuing financial stability within Europe’.90 Still, if the Court is serious about
its qualification of the institutional balance as an (actionable) principle of EU law,
it should allow the institutions, Member States and also private parties to rely on
it, treating their arguments seriously.91 As regards private litigants this would come
down to a reversal of Vreugdenhil, which was criticized recently again by AG Bot.92
Alternatively, the institutional balance would just remain a political ‘bat for the
institutions to swat each other with’.
7 CONCLUSION
In the present contribution the institutional balance was distinguished from the
principle of separation of powers and both concepts were found to be relevant to
the EU since they operate at different levels. So far the institutional balance has
been viewed critically in legal doctrine. According to some authors the notion
does not amount to a principle because the rules defining the relations between
the institutions are either too complex or already detailed enough, because the
notion of balance presupposes a stability which does not yet exist as regards the
EU legal order, or because a principle is enforceable before a Court, which has
insufficiently been the case for the institutional balance. Yet, Lenaerts and
Verhoeven have made a hard case for a legal principle by working out in detail its
content. Following Le Bot, the institutional balance was found to be a principle of
systemic protection which may be employed as a gap-filling principle, in line with
Prechal’s observations.
However, the case law of the Court shows that the principle, qualified as such
by the Court, has not fulfilled its potential. Not only does the Court refuse private
89 It should be noted that these cases are not a confirmation of AG Trstenjak’s conception of the
institutional balance either. In fact, if the institutional balance was about efficacy, the Court could have
perfectly relied on it in Short-selling: today, the effectiveness of EU regulation in the financial sector
depends on the possibility of agencies such as the ESMA to adopt binding measures.
90 M. Everson, ‘European Agencies: Barely Legal?’, in Everson, Monda & Vos (eds), European Agencies in
between Institutions and Member States,Alphen aan de Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2014, p. 50.
91 At the same time, a responsibility of the academic community may be noted as well. For instance, even
if it is recognized that the policy responses to the euro and financial crises affect the institutional
balance, those policy responses are hardly analysed in depth under an institutional balance perspective.
Such an analysis would indeed require a more profound understanding of the principle of institutional
balance, something to which this article hopes to contribute to.
92 Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-221/10 P, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2011:744, paras 40–44.
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parties from relying on the principle, it has further consistently ignored
institutional balance arguments made by the Member States and even the
institutions themselves. In addition, the recent developments following the
financial and euro crisis have put the institutional balance further under pressure.
Still the institutional balance might realize its potential as an actionable principle,
provided that the Court becomes more receptive to institutional balance
arguments brought before it by privileged and non-privileged parties alike, dealing
with these arguments in a more structured fashion.
Yet, if such a turn-around in the Court’s approach does not materialize the
debate on the nature of the institutional balance may also be settled.The notion of
institutional balance would then not amount to a principle of EU law but would
merely be a shorthand for the idea contained in Article 13 TEU. Either of the two
scenarios (a confirmation or a rejection of the institutional balance’s status as a
principle of EU law) would appear preferable above the current unclear situation.
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